The Effects of Shareholder Primacy, Publicness, and
“Privateness” on Corporate Cultures
Donald C. Langevoort
There is widespread belief in both scholarship and business practice
that internal corporate cultures materially affect economic outcomes for
firms. An often-quoted book on management has argued that “the only
thing of real importance that [business] leaders do is to create and manage
culture.”1 A recent academic survey found that 51% of executives sampled
consider corporate culture as a top three “value driver” at their companies,
and another 27% say it is in the top five; a whopping 91% of them say that
improving their corporate culture would increase their firm’s value.2 This
has become an explosive subject of academic research as well. A
prominent 2011 literature review on the connections between corporate
culture and organizational effectiveness initially identified some 4,600
scholarly articles from which to draw,3 a number that would be far larger
today.
In turn, there is also a growing belief that corporate governance
arrangements materially affect corporate cultures. If this is true, it suggests
an intriguing three-link causal chain: governance choices influence
 Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Thanks to
Jennifer Hill, Hillary Sale, and participants at a Vanderbilt law and business workshop for helpful
suggestions. This Article addresses many ideas relating to behavior and culture on which there is a
massive amount of scholarship but will not offer correspondingly extensive citations. Footnotes will
simply highlight some particularly notable examples from the various disciplines at work and their
uses by legal scholars, with special attention to the amazingly rich contributions from the Berle
symposia published in the Seattle University Law Review over the last decade.
1. EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 11 (3d ed. 2004); see also
Boris Groysberg et al., The Leader’s Guide to Corporate Culture: How to Manage the Eight Critical
Elements of Organizational Life, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2018, at 44.
2. See John R. Graham et al., Corporate Culture: Evidence from the Field 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23255, 2017).
3. See Chad A. Hartnell et al., Organizational Culture and Organizational Effectiveness: A
Meta-Analytic Investigation of the Competing Values Framework’s Theoretical Suppositions, 96 J.
APPLIED PSYCH. 677, 682 (2011). For more information on the same subject published more recently,
see generally Elizabeth A. Martinez et al., Organizational Culture and Performance, 105 AM. ECON.
REV. 331, 333–34 (2015) (assessing links between culture and performance).
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corporate performance, at least in part via their effects on internal culture.
This Article explores that possibility. The topic is important to lawyers and
legal scholars because of the symbiotic nature of law and governance with
an increased risk of enhanced corporate criminal and civil liability when
cultures are judged to be deficient.4 Finding the right place for culture in
governance is a heavy lift, deeply rooted in the intense academic and
political battles about agency theory, shareholder primacy, and corporate
social responsibility. As such, the aim of this Article is to explore the many
ways corporate governance and culture are studied; to compare and
contrast theories about what corporate culture is and how it works; and to
study the ways in which it is influenced, and in turn influences, general
social beliefs about economic power and privilege.
By many accounts today (though hardly without controversy), the
dominant norm in American corporate governance is shareholder primacy.
As a result of the combined forces of law, culture, and economic
incentives, managers are to act intently for the wealth-maximizing benefit
of their shareholders. The theoretical justification for this truncated
autonomy is that managers are naturally self-interested, requiring
monitoring of various sorts in the name of (if not by) its shareholders in
order to minimize opportunism in the exercise of power. To enthusiasts
for this principal–agent model of governance, this embrace of the
shareholder primacy norm in the last three or four decades has paid off in
greater productivity, innovation, and capital formation. Many in financial
economics and corporate law, thus, now take it as a normative given.5 To
them, the arguments are only about whether we need to empower and
protect shareholders a bit more, less, or whether we have it about right to
achieve optimal shareholder wealth over the desired time frame and unit
of measurement.6
Against this enthusiasm, many sociologists and some legal scholars
argue that the coupling of shareholder primacy and shareholder
4. See Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 944–49
(2017) [hereinafter Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance]. As discussed infra, the connection between
culture and legal compliance programs has become a substantial subject of discussion in law and
management studies, about which I have written a good deal. In the U.S., assessments of culture matter
at least in terms of prosecutorial discretion and punishment, and increasingly via positive regulatory
mandate. See id. at 940–44. Outside the U.S., the legal consequences of flawed corporate cultures are
increasingly more explicit, if perhaps not all that aggressively enforced. See generally Jennifer G. Hill,
Legal Personhood and Liability for Flawed Corporate Cultures (European Corporate Governance
Institute, Law Working Paper No. 431/2018; Sydney Law School, Research Paper No. 19/03, 2018)
(tracing the growth of interest in cultures in different corporate law systems).
5. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (providing a distinguished example of the embrace of shareholder primacy
and a description of its benefits).
6. So, the debates over long- and short-termism, and about market prices as an accurate (or at
least best available) measure of fundamental value in the long run are still inconclusive.
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empowerment is toxic, with corrosive consequences for society in general
and the long-run interests of firms themselves. They worry that corporate
leaders have come proudly to self-identify as zealous agents for their
shareholders and attack the myths associated with principal–agent theory
insofar as it normalizes unfettered profit-seeking and gross income
inequality.7 Demanding investors who applaud such managers—and the
financial markets they drive through active trading in various financial
instruments—are, in this portrait, sheep-clothed enemies of the public
good. A substantial and increasing amount of popular and public discourse
about greedy short-termism gives voice to this, as we shall see.
Naturally enough, the sociologists and their acolytes in law view
these aspects of governance entirely through the lens of culture. To those
steeped in neoclassical economics, on the other hand, culture studies are
too soft and mushy to have anything of use to offer compared to
understanding the rational incentives that drive managerial and investor
behavior. But, that assumption has been weakening for some time.8 The
particular inspiration for my Article came from reading a recent series of
papers in financial economics purporting to find that shareholder
empowerment in corporate governance tends, as sociologists fervently
predict, to degrade previously ethical corporate cultures. A study by
Professors Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (GSZ) finds a significant
positive correlation for publicly traded companies between survey-based
indicators of how employees view the integrity of senior management and
the firm’s financial performance going forward, value not immediately
impounded in stock price.9 More pointedly, they find that privately owned
firms have higher integrity scores on average than otherwise comparable
public ones with large institutional investor block ownership.10 Culture,
they argue, best explains these results, which implies that reducing
shareholder empowerment would help restore integrity to corporate
cultures. The authors are appropriately cautious about their findings,
asking mainly that they provoke an intensive research agenda into the

7. For an excellent book-length account, see generally GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE
MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED AMERICA (2009).
8. For a review, see Quentin Dupont & Jonathan M. Karpoff, The Trust Triangle: Law,
Reputation, and Culture in Empirical Financial Research, J. BUS. ETHICS, June 20, 2019, at 1,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04229-1 [https://perma.cc/RT53-4KF4].
9. Luigi Guiso et al., The Value of Corporate Culture, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 60, 65–66 (2015)
[hereinafter GSZ]; see also, e.g., Jillian Grennan, A Corporate Culture Channel: How Increased
Shareholder Governance Reduces Firm Value 3 (March 29, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with Seattle University Law Review); Andrew von Nordenflycht, The Public Corporation—Friend or
Foe of Professional Ethics? Ownership and Ethics in Securities Brokerage 3 (Apr. 22, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Seattle University Law Review).
10. GSZ, supra note 9, at 65–66.
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economic significance of corporate cultures. From a lawyer’s perspective,
my Article is in that same spirit.
My conundrum question is this: suppose managerialism triumphed
in the governance wars so as to regain its desired level of autonomy from
shareholder pressures for boards and managers—would we then expect to
see a cultural shift inside corporations toward greater honesty and civil
engagement, and if so, why?11 A helpful diagnostic question is to ask how
managers currently construe shareholder and market primacy. Have they
internalized it as a value or do they instead resent the demands? My
argument here leans more toward resentment, though my contribution is
more about how to develop a credible hypothesis than how to prove it,
which is ultimately an empirical matter.12 My hypothesis is that corporate
cultures ordinarily reflect an inward point of view wherein the perceived
(and maybe mythical) imperatives of organizational survival and success
become the dominating values, not serving shareholders or anyone else.
Culture is deeply self-protective. If so, more unfettered managerialism in
pursuit of better corporate cultures would not be such an appealing
solution, and indeed might just produce a different form of rent-seeking.13
This then takes us to a second front in the governance wars.14 Many
legal scholars recently (myself included) have written about the increasing
demands of “publicness” on highly salient firms, especially those that are
publicly traded.15 These are external, socially-generated pressures in the
name of legitimacy, transparency, accountability, and outsider voice. As
to these forces, sociologists and their legal kin are downright enthusiastic.
After all, if shareholder primacy degrades corporate culture, then these
pressures should have precisely the opposite effect, serving as a channel
11. See generally Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the
Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169 (2013) (arguing that shareholder
primacy is already giving way to a new managerialist philosophy).
12. See generally Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, The Agency Cost Paradigm: The Good,
the Bad, and the Ugly, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 561 (2015) (assessing both the strategic and substantive
aspects of the academic debate). I do agree that segments of the investor community pushed the norm
of shareholder primacy, at least in part, to enhance their own power and legitimacy.
13. This connects to work in financial economics showing that a shift from public to private
status—i.e., a private equity transaction—reduces agency costs. See Jesse Edgerton, Agency Problems
in Public Firms: Evidence from Corporate Jets in Leveraged Buyouts, 67 J. FIN. 2187, 2189–90
(2012).
14. See generally Christopher M. Bruner, Center-Left Politics and Corporate Governance: What
is the “Progressive” Agenda?, 2018 BYU L. REV. 267 (2018) (addressing the complicated nature of
the political landscape as between shareholder and stakeholder primacy).
15. For articles dealing with publicness as a concept, see, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert
B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO.
L.J. 337, 340 (2013); Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
137 passim (2011); Onnig H. Dombalagian, Principles for Publicness, 67 FLA. L. REV. 649 passim
(2015).
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by which pro-social instincts are infused into them. This, arguably, is what
would rush in to freshen the cultural climate once the swamp of
shareholder primacy is drained. But for many of the same reasons that I
question the deep normativity of shareholder primacy, I am skeptical of
this inference as well.16
The remainder of this Article explains these doubts, which requires
an introduction to the economics of corporate culture, a subject not yet
well appreciated in corporate law. Accordingly, Part I introduces the battle
over corporate cultures as part of a broader contestation about primacy in
corporate governance, offering a perspective on the meaning of corporate
culture, its place in political debates over corporate responsibility, and its
usefulness to corporate law. This first Part also tries to define with more
clarity the differences between the cultural norms of shareholder primacy
and publicness. Part II is introductory as well, turning the reader’s
attention to the overwhelmingly diverse scholarly perspectives on
corporate culture (II(A)) and the essential place of corporate culture within
the overarching canopy of social culture (II(B)). Part III moves on to ask
about the work being done by corporate culture in terms of both law and
governance, and the extent to which this can or should be thought of in
functionalist terms. Parts IV and V are the main pay-off: an assessment of
arguments in light of all the foregoing about the cultural causes and effects
about shareholder primacy, publicness, and “privateness.” Part VI
concludes with a closer look at the politics surrounding the corporate
culture wars.
I. GOVERNANCE AND CULTURE
Matters relating to managerial prerogative vis-à-vis either
shareholder rights or societal interests have been a contested intellectual
and political battleground for the last fifty years, at least. The fundamental
questions are by now familiar ones.17 Are shareholders or a broader set of
stakeholders the intended beneficiaries of corporate law, and why?18 Then,
depending on the response to that first question, what mix of rights and
16. To be clear, I self-identify as seeking a more public-regarding conception of corporate rights
and responsibilities, with shareholder power nonetheless playing a legitimate and important subsidiary
role to check a dangerous excess of managerialism. Cf. Robert B. Thompson, Anti-Primacy: Sharing
Power in American Corporations, 71 BUS. LAW. 381 (2015) (articulating a separation of powers
analogy).
17. See generally RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER passim (Jennifer G. Hill &
Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015) (multiple chapters offering perspectives on this issue). This includes
battling over using stock market prices as the dominating metric for good or bad governance.
18. To be sure, most would agree that the economic system and all its institutions exist for
society’s benefit. Those who push a strong vision of shareholder primacy believe that it creates better
conditions for maximum efficiency, innovation, and optimal social (as well as private) wealth.
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responsibilities as among managers, directors, shareholders, and other
stakeholders produces the optimal output of the preferred benefit?
Students of corporate governance (and readers of the Berle symposia)
know that there can be endless mixing and matching of possible answers.
Even if shareholder best interest is the chosen goal, for instance, one can
be in favor of either more managerial autonomy or greater shareholder
power—this is still probably the biggest divide among legal scholars and
financial economists. On the other hand, if one thinks that broader public
or stakeholder interests deserve primacy, one could still be in favor of
more managerial autonomy, more shareholder power, or (most commonly)
enhanced stakeholder or government influence.
The debates surrounding the role of the shareholder are mainly
academic, but they connect to serious political battling that has been going
on for many decades now. The usual historical narrative posits that
managerialism held sway for a few decades during the middle part of the
last century, enabling managers to share some of the rents with employees,
communities, and the government (“benevolent managerialism”), though
perhaps also wasting resources in sinecures and inefficiency.19 Exploring
this was Adolf Berle’s project back in the day.20 Nearly everyone now
agrees that some kind of inflection occurred around the late 1970s through
the 1980s due to a mix of interrelated forces,21 including, in no particular
order: (1) the growth of institutional investors who used their new-found
leverage to achieve greater shareholder empowerment vis-à-vis
management; (2) the rise of independent directors; (3) advances in the
market for corporate control and a shift in the law dealing with control
transactions from business judgment to something (in Delaware, at least)
more shareholder-regarding;22 (4) technological change in both production
and finance that turned corporate attention to new capital marketplace
opportunities; (5) an explosion in scholarship in business and law that was
enthusiastically in support of shareholder primacy to counter managerial
selfishness (agency costs), the lessons of which became central in business
19. For a discussion of the behavioral consequences of enhance managerial prerogative, see
generally Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate
Governance and Managerial Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043 (2003).
20. For one of many studies of Berle and the problems that interested him, see William W.
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern Corporation’s
Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849 (2010).
21. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 19502005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1510–40 (2007).
22. See id. at 1520–28. Although Delaware law had a brief period in the mid-1980s that can so
be described, it backed off any embrace of hostile control transactions in the Paramount Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Time Inc. litigation in 1989. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). Nearly all other states have already
moved to give management more leeway to defeat a bid, no matter how lucrative to shareholders. Of
all the forces supposedly pushing in the direction of shareholder primacy, law is probably the weakest.
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schools and law schools; (6) far more stock-based compensation for
corporate executives; and (7) the stunning growth in the number of
American households who invested in common stock, directly or
indirectly, and could thus envision themselves as intended beneficiaries.
While these were economic shifts, not just cultural ones, it is common to
hear claims that the inflection brought about a new culture of shareholder
primacy with the sole goal of shareholder wealth maximization.23
Managers became agents, and shareholders became their principals.
The political skirmishing in corporate governance that continues on
today is about the consequences of this inflection, which plays out in the
dark shadow of what today is immense public unease about economic
fairness and opportunity. The current generation of battlers sort into
different encampments that fight under three main banners.24 On one side
are the staunch managerialists who simply want back the autonomy they
arguably lost, and to preserve what they still have. They have a small cadre
of allies in those who may be attracted to either shareholder or stakeholder
primacy but think that strong managerialism is instrumentally the best way
to pursue their preferred ends. Together, they fight against committed
shareholder primacists who want more rights and greater managerial
accountability to investors.25 We should not over-dramatize: it is not
always clear how much value really is at stake as to the specific issues
being contested here (e.g., staggered boards, proxy access, shareholder
voice, say-on-pay); some of the tenacity seems more about identity and
pride than large territorial gains.26 Still, combatants on each side push hard
23. For a good discussion of all these changes and the shareholder-regarding culture they
produced, see generally DAVIS, supra note 7.
24. Many of those leaning more to the conservative side argue that now that managerial and
shareholder interests are better aligned via a set of largely non-legal institutions, labor, product, and
financial markets can largely be left alone to generate the optimal incentives needed for wealth
maximization. Their opponents say that a greater dose of legally-induced shareholder empowerment
is still needed to counter a lingering excess of managerial prerogative. Compare ROBERTA ROMANO,
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993), with LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).
25. To describe all this in war-like terms is hyperbole, of course; governance issues in the U.S.
have never (at least not yet) received enough sustained public attention for that description to fit. In
general, the managerialists are well organized and so have the upper hand in ordinary times. See
generally Usha Rodrigues, Dictation and Delegation in Securities Regulation, 92 IND. L.J. 435 (2017)
(pointing out that corporate law issues normally have low political visibility). Scandals, of course,
have long prompted short-term legislative attention to governance abuses, which are the source of
much of what we know today as corporate and (especially) federal securities law. See generally
Bruner, supra note 14; Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 1817, 1820–22 (2007). On how fleeting the effects can be, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr.,
The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic
Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019 (2012).
26. See Claire A. Hill, An Identity Theory of the Short- and Long-Term Investor Debate, 41
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 475, 483–94 (2018) (giving illustrations of identity-driven arguments). Indeed,
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to get their way from legislatures, agencies like the SEC, and courts (or at
least try to block the same by their opponents27), exerting pressure on
public and elite opinion to gain leverage.
There is a second front in these governance wars. Those who wanted
greater corporate social responsibility in the 1970s and 1980s were
seemingly shoved aside as the fight between shareholder advocates and
managers became the main event.28 So stakeholder primacists mostly grit
their teeth through the 1990s. In 2001 and 2002, Enron and Worldcom
finally gave them their told-you-so moment via what seemed to be
shareholder wealth maximization run amok.29 By this time, the counternarrative had emerged, in sociology in particular, that treated agency cost
theory and shareholder primacy as destructive myths that became deeply
internalized as legitimate yet promoted corporate irresponsibility. The
culture of wealth maximization had blinded all of us, they claimed, to what
was now lost (expectations of benign managerialism in the interest of
society as a whole) and the escalating risks that could be justified in the
name of enhancing equity portfolios, including managers’ own bloated
ones. Expectations that managers naturally pursued selfish goals (the
justification for the principal–agent model of corporate governance)
became dangerously self-fulfilling and normalizing. The global financial
crisis a few years later extended that to the problem of systemic risk among
financial firms, which brought with it much more pain and angst about
whether society had lost its way in the relentless pursuit of wealth for both
shareholders and managers.30

there is a good argument to be made that the battling simply creates the illusion that managerial power
is being moderated, thereby deflecting responsibility and blame. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B.
Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1997, 2034–37 (2014) (discussing
myths in corporate law). Or maybe stalemate in the battling is good—a recognition that neither side
deserves total victory. See generally Thompson, supra note 16 (discussing virtues of checks and
balances in corporate governance).
27. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (challenging the
legality of pro-shareholder reforms).
28. During the portion of the governance wars of the late 1970s and 1980s, dealing with the
market for corporate control and hostile corporate takeovers, stakeholders (particularly labor, but also
local communities) strongly allied with the managerialists and together won many more battles than
they lost—indeed, to the point where the incidence of hostile takeovers diminished considerably. But
they were being used for the most part; as sociologist critics insist, whatever happened to hostile
takeovers, the trend toward shareholder wealth maximization continued along other paths.
29. These were massive financial reporting scandals that resulted in the insolvency of two of the
country’s largest public companies. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution
and the Devolution of Corporate Financial Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter
Langevoort, Technological Evolution] (tracing the causes and consequences of the scandals).
30. On the connections between shareholder influence and losses in the crisis, see generally
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 653 (2010).
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Societal unease with the unchecked pursuit of private wealth and
power underlies the distinctive demands of publicness. Publicness is a
relatively new label in legal scholarship, if not necessarily a new idea.
While publicness can simply refer to the purely regulatory consequences
that arise when a firm becomes subject to the mandates of the federal
securities laws, the construct is in fact deeply cultural. The label describes
the consequences when influential actors in society expect corporate
managers and owners to pay attention to public-regarding preferences and
not heedlessly pursue selfish corporate objectives. As applied to corporate
governance, this commonly comes in the form of insistence on more
transparency, openness to others’ voices, and accountability for harms that
threaten or are felt by persons outside the firm.31 Publicness is legitimacybased, claiming that the corporation’s right to exercise large-scale
economic power comes with a quid pro quo—some sociologists pushing
a similar idea call it “social license.”32 Insofar as it has a normative rather
than purely descriptive connotation—i.e., that transparency, voice, and
accountability are valuable public goods, not just common memes—it
shares space with the progressive agendas of corporate social
responsibility and sustainability, albeit with more emphasis on the process
of governance than particular outcomes.
The idea behind publicness is simple enough. Corporations that fall
short of expectations suffer reputationally in many different ways when
something serious goes wrong. And the legal consequences that follow
will often be harsher because of those perceived shortcomings. Thus, it
behooves boards of directors in particular to understand and acknowledge
the special challenges that come when avoiding and dealing with potential
scandals that implicate these values. Law is a very big part of publicness,
in that sometimes these inchoate demands get worked into new legal rules
or enforcement of existing rules by regulators and enforcers who share,
promote, or are otherwise influenced by those societal values.33 The
31. See Bruner, supra note 14, at 297–303. The original use of publicness in legal scholarship
came from comparative administrative law, with the observation of how the demands of transparency,
accountability, and voice that had become settled with respect to governmental authorities were being
directed to powerful non-governmental organizations as well. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept
of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 30–31 (2009).
32. See Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses
Go Beyond Compliance, 29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 307, 313–22 (2004). As used here, publicness is a term
of art for the amalgam of ways managerial autonomy is challenged by external public demands beyond
simple law enforcement. It has connections to many scholarly constructs in various fields, such as
reputational capital in economics and the “halo effect” in psychology and economics.
33. See Jill E. Fisch, The Mess at Morgan: Risk, Incentives and Shareholder Empowerment, 83
U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 679, 681 (2015) (analyzing Morgan scandals). See generally Hillary A. Sale, J.P.
Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1629 (2014) (analyzing Morgan
scandals).
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securities laws are a favored tool for this insofar they address a potent
source of private privilege and power (large corporations) with a built-in
bias for both transparency and accountability, and some inviting pathways
for voice as well via shareholder voting.
A clear manifestation of publicness is the increasing
acknowledgement that bolstering a healthy corporate culture is part of
officers’ and directors’ business judgment responsibilities. Growing
pressure in this direction has stemmed from noxious compliance (and
seemingly cultural) disasters that go back to Enron and the financial crisis
and extend forward to contemporary failures at firms like Wells Fargo,
General Motors, Volkswagen, and the money center banks caught up in
the LIBOR-rigging scandal.34 The Department of Justice and certain
regulatory authorities have stressed that evidence of an unhealthy
corporate culture may matter in terms of how painful a sanction is imposed
in the event of wrongdoing, or upon whom.35 There is even more of a buyin to this in European countries.36 The Netherlands central bank, for
instance, has a team of social scientists (mostly psychologists) trained to
spot dysfunctional behaviors and cultures and who can recommend
leadership changes as a corrective if needed.37
Corporate culture has thus become part of the governance wars on
both fronts.38 Anti-managerialists accuse their opponents in the executive
suite of enabling cultures of greed and arrogance that lead to the corporate
34. See generally Dan Awrey et al., Between Law and Markets: Is There a Role for Culture and
Ethics in Financial Regulation?, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191 (2013) (discussing financial crisis scandals);
Benjamin van Rooij & Adam Fine, Toxic Corporate Culture: Assessing Organizational Processes of
Deviancy, ADMIN. SCI., Sept. 2018 (discussing recent scandals). For recent discussions on how to
regulate with a view toward better cultures, see Hui Chen & Eugene Soltes, Why Compliance
Programs Fail—and How to Fix Them, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2018, at 116; Linda K. Treviño
et al., Regulating for Ethical Culture, BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y, May 23, 2018, at 57. Both articles point
to the pressing need to develop better metrics by which the quality of corporate cultures and climates
can be assessed.
35. I have explored the idea of challenges associated with a “culture of compliance” in depth
elsewhere and so will not address the cultural dimension of compliance programs to any great extent
here. See Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra note 4, at 944–45 and passim.
36. See generally Hill, supra note 4 (comparing jurisdictions around the world).
37. See generally DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK, SUPERVISION OF BEHAVIOR AND CULTURE:
FOUNDATIONS, PRACTICE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 159 (2015); John M. Conley et al., Can Soft
Regulation Prevent Financial Crises?: The Dutch Central Bank’s Supervision of Behavior and
Culture, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 773 (2019).
38. This is particularly at the federal level, with efforts to limit the SEC’s disclosure authority to
matters of financial materiality and the goals of securities regulation to investor protection and
(especially) capital formation. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK:
CORPORATIONS, WALL STREET, AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 108, 164–66 (2016)
[hereinafter LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE]. As Mark Roe points out, something of a bargain exists
among managers, investors, and the state of Delaware to minimize stakeholder pressures on otherwise
efficient governance arrangements. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491,
2493–94 (2005).
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scandals we read about with all too much frequency. The managerialists
return fire with charges, arguably supported by research like GSZ, of
rampant cultural degradation by selfish investors who force managers to
obsess over short-term results.39 These cross-claims imply something
(accurately or not) about group-level character and disposition, which in
turn affects attributions of responsibility and blame when good or bad
things happen. They help portray organizational actors as good guys or
bad guys, perceptions that become usable ammunition in the political and
legal skirmishing.
Before moving on to examine governance and culture in more detail,
note something about the two separate factions against which the
managerialists seem to be fighting. In principle (and in fact), those
favoring more of a public-facing role for large corporations along the
second front should be very wary of those who fight on the other front for
more shareholder influence. But, the politics of corporate governance are
complicated. Shareholder and stakeholder advocates have a common foe
in the managerialists, and the managerialists have considerable political
clout. They thus have to fight as allies to avoid a beating, fundamental
philosophical differences notwithstanding. As a result, the biggest
investors often appear as leading advocates for public-regarding values,
and progressives often support greater shareholder rights.40 Institutional
investors like Blackrock—and even more so public pension fund
investors41—play the publicness game quite openly.42 As such,
shareholder and stakeholder interests can easily get lumped together as
kindred challenges to managerial autonomy. And so, any evidence that
somehow associates increased shareholder rights with bad culture, fairly
39. As past Berle symposia contributions have amply shown, many commentators claim that
shareholder primacy and empowerment are the enemy of the common good and, thus, could be
expected to join in the celebration of empirical evidence that associates it with a higher incidence of
bad corporate behavior. As discussed infra, this was the point championed by the late Lynn Stout, both
in individual work and joint efforts with Margaret Blair. For significant examples, see generally Stout,
supra note 11. See also Margaret M. Blair, Boards of Directors as Mediating Hierarchs, 38 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 297 (2015); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001).
40. See generally Bruner, supra note 14 (describing how many forces lead to this complicate
political map, which among other things produce a “left-center” embrace of shareholder rights in
federal securities law, but an inconsistent-seeming skepticism of shareholder primacy as to matters of
the state corporate law).
41. See generally DAVID H. WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER:
LABOR’S LAST BEST WEAPON (2018) (exploring the law and politics of labor’s use of securities
regulation and corporate law devices).
42. In the right circumstances, institutional shareholder pressure—and its influence on stock
prices—can be important pathways through which publicness norms spread. See Chitru S. Fernando
et al., Corporate Environmental Policy and Shareholder Value: Following the Smart Money, 52 J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 2023, 2024–25 (2017).
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or not, can be appropriated by politically savvy managerialists to claim
that more autonomy on the whole—including freedom from publicness in
all its manifestations—would bring about healthier corporate cultures and
better outcomes for all. This connects to Mark Roe’s recent conjecture that
the contemporary crusade against short-termism allows executives to
deflect responsibility for the economic dislocation palpably felt by the
public: “‘We’re not the problem’ . . . . ‘It’s the short-term traders and the
activist shareholders that prevent us from being the good guys we’d really
otherwise be. Our hands are tied.’”43
II. IN SEARCH OF CORPORATE CULTURE
A. Interdisciplinarity
Now that this Article has introduced the relationship among
corporate culture, shareholder primacy, and publicness, the next two
Sections explore the diverse scholarly perspectives on corporate culture
and pinpoint its essential place within the overarching canopy of social
culture. To be clear up front, my aim here is not to assess the consequences
for the firm of either shareholder power or publicness. Rather, it is to ask
what role culture plays in that process, and what is going on in the
collective mindset of the firm. Many scholars, including occasional
contributors to prior Berle symposia, have made more direct arguments
without resorting to cultural explanations or invoking soft concepts like
social construction or legitimacy.44 For example, they may argue that
greater shareholder power leads directly to certain outcomes (e.g., shorttermism). Perhaps that is sensible, in the name of parsimony. If incentives
and revealed preferences tell a convincing enough story as a matter of
theory or empirical observation, why bother with culture? I have some
answers, but they will have to wait. The remainder of this still-introductory
Section simply takes inventory of the interdisciplinary tools available to
study corporate culture once we choose to pay attention to it.45 Readers
already familiar with all this can skip forward.
While there are many definitions of culture in organizational studies,
we can think of culture as an internal “system of shared values defining
what is important, and norms[] defining appropriate attitudes and

43. Mark J. Roe, Stock Market Short-Termism’s Impact, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 71, 116 (2018).
44. For a good discussion, see id. at 75–82.
45. Legal scholars have drawn from this work for some time, often using it to mount critical
attacks on the conservative, laissez faire attitudes in corporate law that fail to restrain anti-social
corporate norms. An early legal classic is CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE
SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975).
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behaviors”46 or, more simply perhaps, “how we do things around here.”47
These are capacious to be sure. At its core, corporate culture deals with
taken-for-granted values about good and bad, right and wrong, legitimate
and illegitimate, in the way the firm conducts its business. Culture extends
as well into the more mundane, including styles of speech, appropriate
appearance, and the like. These are less important but not inconsequential;
expected shirt colors or style of dress might have little meaning in any
deep sense, for example, but send a message indirectly about authority and
conformity.
This is where assessing the cultural causes and effects of something
like shareholder primacy gets hard. First, the general assumption in the
literature is that neither owners nor senior management teams can
determine the culture (though they surely have a “tone at the top” role in
it).48 We are looking for powerful norms that influence a large portion of
managers and others who get work done. And we are looking for beliefs
and values that are embraced. Strong shareholder pressure surely has
incentive effects: if a small set of large institutional investors can demand
the replacement of the chief executive officer (CEO), or ramp up
compensation incentives to align managerial preferences with those of
transient shareholders, that power will be felt inside the firm. But, there is
no reason to assume that norms will shift to legitimize that power. To the
contrary, the consequences might be resentment and reactance from the
managers whose autonomy lessens.
Indeed, that is the claim I am making here. Particularly as to applied
practitioners in law and business, there is a desire for more than this kind
of theory or abstraction in invoking culture. Practitioners want the ability
to assess, if not actually feel, culture in operation—to understand its
content and the routes by which its forces travel. So where to look for
useful insights?49 This is where sociologists and cultural anthropologists
claim their authority. Such deep dives, they say, are precisely what their
field is good at.50 Researchers do sustained ethnographic studies inside
46. Charles A. O’Reilly & Jennifer A. Chatman, Culture as Social Control: Corporations, Cults,
and Commitment, 18 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 157, 166 (1996).
47. Treviño et al., supra note 34, at 60.
48. See Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra note 4, at 939.
49. An excellent recent review along these lines is Jennifer A. Chatman & Charles A. O’Reilly,
Paradigm Lost: Reinvigorating the Study of Organizational Culture, 36 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 199, 202–
13 (2016).
50. For a thought-provoking call for more use of ethnography in corporate governance and law,
see generally Gwendolyn Gordon, Culture in Corporate Law or: A Black Corporation, a Christian
Corporation, and a Māori Corporation Walk into a Bar..., 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 353, 357 (2016).
For notable examples of corporate ethnography, see for example KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN
ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET (2009); ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF
CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988); WILLIAM M. O’BARR & JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY:
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individual companies, spending time on the inside to hear their
descriptions and stories and identify the myths, routines, ceremonies, and
totems that collectively come to define what is legitimate and valued or
treated with scorn or disgust. Less intrusive techniques are available as
well: structured interviews and surveys to elicit impressions from a wider
range of persons in a firm or industry, which can be pieced together into
coherent accounts of both commonalities and differences in expressed
beliefs.51
Large organizations operate on a scale that is hard for any research
team to observe in real time, however, which necessarily means that it will
be studying just a slice of the enterprise, and only at a particular time.
Moreover, it can be difficult to gain access to the most sensitive personnel
within an organization or know that they are being candid rather than
reciting from internalized scripts. Given these challenges, the risk is that
interpretation of culture becomes more art than science, enabling the
researchers’ own prior assumptions and biases to take hold. First-rate
ethnographic work in the corporate area exists notwithstanding these
challenges,52 though the most influential contemporary research in the
sociology of corporate behavior appears to be more a mix of theory (e.g.,
field theory, social constructionism) and data analysis—very much
resembling what GSZ does.53
While the field of organizational behavior might have been formed
under the influence of sociology, today it draws just as much from research
in psychology, particularly social cognition. Here, the individual brain
becomes the main focus of inquiry into judgment and decision-making
inside business organizations.54 The main tools for understanding
THE WEALTH AND POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING (1992); John M. Conley & William M.
O’Barr, Crime and Custom in Corporate Society: A Cultural Perspective on Corporate Misconduct,
60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1997). More generally on research challenges, see DAVID A.
WESTBROOK, NAVIGATORS OF THE CONTEMPORARY: WHY ETHNOGRAPHY MATTERS (2008); Greg
Urban & Kyung-Nan Koh, Ethnographic Research on Modern Business Corporations, 42 ANN. REV.
ANTHROP. 139 (2013).
51. See Garry C. Gray & Susan S. Silbey, Governing Inside the Organization: Interpreting
Regulation and Compliance, 120 AM. J. SOC. 96, 106–07 (2014) (using both ethnography and
structured interviews to study compliance practices).
52. See Marina Welker, Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the Corporation, 39 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 397, 404–06 (2016).
53. For examples of these mixed methodologies, see Neil Fligstein, The Theory of Fields and Its
Application to Corporate Governance, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 237 (2016); Jiwook Jung & Frank
Dobbin, Agency Theory as Prophecy: How Boards, Analysts and Fund Managers Perform Their
Roles, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 291 (2016).
54. An excellent discussion of the divide between sociology and psychology in organizational
behavior with a welcome stress on ways it might be bridged is Barry M. Staw & Robert I. Sutton,
Macro Organizational Psychology, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS 350, 353 (J. Keith
Murnighan ed., 1993). More recently, with a focus on culture and other forces at work in determining
responses to legal demands, see Ruthanne Huising & Susan S. Silbey, From Nudge to Culture and
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perception and choice are controlled laboratory experiments. Of particular
relevance to thinking about legal compliance is the burgeoning subdiscipline of behavioral ethics—judgment and decision-making in choices
about right and wrong, including obedience to law.55 There are massive
numbers of interesting studies, which in turn are described in a number of
very accessible books and extensive literature reviews of behavioral ethics
by prominent psychologists and management scholars.56 Legal scholars
have drawn extensively from social cognition and the study of managerial
traits to shed light on numerous issues of corporate governance and
compliance.57
There are severe methodological challenges to the use of psychology
in organizational behavior as well. However, even if sound in
experimental design, experiments may fail to capture the social richness
and incentive structures found in complex organizations. The individual’s
behavior, or at best small group behavior, is the focus of study. This
methodological individualism means that culture is thereby diminished in
importance. There may also be concern that decision-making in business
settings is by people who have been selected for and survived the rigors of
competition and are thus not representative of the more random sampling
that generates subjects for psychology experiments.
So, culture remains slippery to grab hold of, leading to some
inevitable methodological accommodations to gain traction. Some
psychologists working on organizational behavior, for example, simply
assume from common sense or anecdotal observation that the same
heuristics and biases found in individual judgment will naturally be
replicated in corporate cultures, perhaps even amplified.58 That is, if
people generally work hard cognitively to maintain—accurately or not—
a self-conception as good, law-abiding citizens, we would expect to find
the same work being done for the firm by its internal culture.
Other empirical work in organizational behavior tries to get at culture
indirectly. “Upper echelon” research focuses on the impact of firm leaders
on corporate behaviors, following up on a long-standing debate between
Back Again: Coalface Governance in the Regulated Organization, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 91,
105–07 (2018).
55. For a recent overview, see generally YUVAL FELDMAN, THE LAW OF GOOD PEOPLE:
CHALLENGING STATES’ ABILITY TO REGULATE HUMAN BEHAVIOR (2018); LANGEVOORT, SELLING
HOPE, supra note 38, at 28.
56. See, e.g., EUGENE SOLTES, WHY THEY DO IT: INSIDE THE MIND OF THE WHITE COLLAR
CRIMINAL 135–37 (2016); Nicholas Epley & David Tannenbaum, Treating Ethics as a Design
Problem, BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y., May 2017, at 73; Treviño et al., supra note 34; Linda Klebe Treviño
et al., (Un)ethical Behavior in Organizations, 65 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 635 (2014).
57. Myself included. See Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra note 4, at 950–51.
58. For a good survey, see generally Norbert Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing
Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCH. REV. 687 (1996).
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those who think leadership drives both culture and choice and those who
deem leaders to be largely of symbolic or ceremonial significance.
Numerous researchers seek proof in one direction or the other; one recent
study confidently found a clear link running from individual CEO
personality characteristics relating to adaptability and attention to detail to
the prevailing culture, for example, and then from culture to objective
measures of financial performance.59 That finding sounds a lot like
financial economics.
Economists arrived late to culture studies; in neoclassical economic
models, as noted earlier, culture was thought to offer little of use given the
commitment to rational expectations and revealed preferences. But for the
last few decades, more and more economists, too, have come to accept that
there are powerful connections between culture of various sorts and
economic outcomes.60 They see corporate cultures as a potentially efficient
means of coordinating complex activity and, perhaps, countering both
agency costs and free rider problems.61
Unlike sociologists and cultural anthropologists, economists are
dedicated functionalists with efficiency as the prime criterion, and they are
more likely to make inferences about culture from observable inputs and
outputs than subjective assessment. As data sources become bigger and
more manipulable, these observations become more intriguing. A good
example is a study showing that firms with CEOs who benefit from
suspicious and possibly illegal activity (options backdating) are more
likely to engage in unrelated misbehaviors as well, signaling an unethical
culture.62 In addition to economic, sociological, and psychological studies
on corporate cultures, there are other cross-disciplinary approaches as
well. Behavioral ethics has particularly interesting insights that, for

59. See Charles A. O’Reilly, III et al., The Promise and Problems of Organizational Culture:
CEO Personality, Culture, and Firm Performance, 39 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 595, 607 (2014).
60. Earlier work by GSZ focused on general cultural forces and their impact on economic
behavior. Luigi Guiso et al., Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 23, 25–30
(2006). They connect general culture and corporate culture in Luigi Guiso et al., Corporate Culture,
Societal Culture, and Institutions, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 336, 337–38 (2015).
61. E.g., David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON
POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90, 93 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990); Ernst Fehr,
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Culture 2–4 (UBS Int’l Ctr. Of Econ. In Soc’y Public Paper
No. 7, 2018). For my commentary, see generally Donald C. Langevoort, Opening the Black Box of
“Corporate Culture” in Law and Economics, 162 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 80 (2006)
[hereinafter Langevoort, Black Box] (discussing adaptive theory of cultural content).
62. Lee Biggerstaff et al., Suspect CEOs, Unethical Culture and Corporate Misbehavior, 117 J.
FIN. ECON. 98, 99–100 (2015); see also Robert Davidson et al., Executives’ “Off the Job” Behavior,
Corporate Culture and Financial Reporting Risk, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 7 (2015).
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example, support some of the predictions of conventional economics.63
Advances in cognitive neuroscience—the newest wave of behavioral
research64—show some early promise as well in assessing the impact of
culture on group beliefs and social behaviors.65
All these different ways of getting at corporate culture produce a
useful ecological diversity. But purists in each discipline too often seem
not to read each other, much less collaborate, and we have noted some of
the mutual mistrust directed at the respective methodologies. Sociologists
and anthropologists draw a fairly hard line to push back against causal
accounts and lessons that focus on individual-level behaviors and
interventions rather than social forces. Famously, they treat the standards
and metrics economists use—market efficiency and principal-agency
conflicts, in particular—as the products of social construction manifesting
themselves in observable behaviors only because they are believed to be
true—Robert Merton’s idea of the self-fulfilling prophecy played out in
markets.66 That, in turn, makes conventional economists’ collective heads
explode. Here is where the governance and culture battle lines form.
B. Corporate Cultures Inside Social Culture
Corporate culture operates within an overarching canopy of social
culture. To be sure, some law-oriented discussions of corporate culture
simply seem to assume that shared values and beliefs are entirely firmspecific, so that all the interesting and important instigators of cultural
differences are at work inside the boundaries of a given firm. That can be
true almost by definition. Corporate cultures are the belief systems that
operate with respect to the firm and its activities, so they are necessarily
internal to it. But that focus misses something very important.
63. For a thorough discussion, see Eyal Zamir, Reinforcing Law and Economics: Behavioral
Support for the Predictions of Standard Economic Analysis (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem Legal
Research Paper No. 18-17, 2018) (on file with Seattle University Law Review).
64. On the promise and limits of neuroeconomics, see generally Carlos Alós-Ferrer, A Review
Essay on Social Neuroscience: Can Research on the Social Brain and Economics Inform Each Other?,
56 J. ECON. LIT. 234 (2018); Owen D. Jones, Brain Perspectives on Investor Behavior and DecisionMaking Errors, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 349 (2018). For a useful introduction to neuroeconomics, see
generally ROBERT M. SOPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT THEIR BEST AND WORST
(2017).
65. For an interesting commentary on the role of “groupishness” in organizational ethical
behavior points to the role of oxytocin in the human brain, see Jesse Kluver et al., Behavioral Ethics
for Homo Economicus, Homo Heuristicus, and Homo Duplex, 123 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 150, 154 (2014) (noting that “[a]ll of these consequences of the release of oxytocin serve
a group-related purpose—namely, they serve to bind individuals to highly cooperative higher-level
units, often in the service of outcompeting other groups”).
66. E.g., Jung & Dobbin, supra note 53, at 319 (following Merton). For a somewhat less critical
view, see generally Ezra Zuckerman, Market Efficiency: A Sociological Perspective, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF FINANCE 223 (Karin Knorr Cetina & Alex Preda, eds., 2012).
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As anthropologist Greg Urban stressed in an essay for an earlier
Berle symposium, firm boundaries are actually very porous when it comes
to external cultural influences.67 From CEOs on down, employees bring
multiple aspects of the broader “outside” social and economic culture to
work with them each day. Urban notes that this is essential to business
success. Acute awareness of marketplace opportunities, risks, and trends
requires being in synch with these broader social forces and their
normative content. Individual corporate cultures (and industry cultures,
etc.) are better seen as subcultures in motion within this complicated
societal fabric, not discrete or insular phenomena. Indeed, as we shall see,
the dominant sociological account of the corporate culture treats it as part
of the much larger fabric of social culture, of which any given corporate
culture is but a part.68
Many important legal scholars have drawn useful insights for how
corporate law operates (or should operate) from the assumption that
general social norms strongly influence corporate behavior. John Coffee
once suggested that the likelihood of minority shareholder abuse probably
correlates fairly closely with perceived level of social cohesion, suggesting
a top-down effect of general norms of law-abidingness translating into
norms of corporate behavior.69 Ed Rock famously developed a shaming
theory of how Delaware case law works. It often subjects defendants to
meaningful public criticism—even while absolving them from actual
liability.70 The lively scholarship of corporate “publicness,” with which
we began, stresses the behavioral demands that come from social
expectations about the terms and conditions that go with the exercise of
corporate power.71
In financial economics, there are many scholars exploring the causal
links between various manifestations of general cultural belief (e.g.,

67. See also Greg Urban, Corporate Compliance as a Problem of Cultural Motion, 69 RUTGERS
U. L. REV. 495 (2017) (extending ideas to corporate compliance). See generally Greg Urban,
Corporations in the Flow of Culture, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 321 (2016) (discussing interplay of social
and corporate norms).
68. This is a main point in the survey by Dupont & Karpoff, supra note 8.
69. See John C. Coffee Jr., Do Norms Matter:? A Cross-Country Examnination of the Private
Benefits of Control, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2151 (2001) (concluding that norms may be more powerful
than constitutive legal rules).
70. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1009, 1047–49 (1997).
71. For other law-oriented discussions of corporations and cultural norms, see generally, e.g.,
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the SelfGoverning Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001); Mark J. Roe, Can Culture Constrain the
Economic Model of Corporate Law?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251 (2002).
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religiosity72 and politics73) and corporate financial decisions or
performance. These studies suggest that firms whose principal office is
located in a geographic area with distinctively liberal or conservative
views, for instance, make different business and financial decisions from
peer firms in different locales. GSZ makes a brief reference to the fact that
a disproportionate number of high integrity firms in their sample were
from the southern part of the U.S.74
To the extent that these external social norms are healthy ones, this
is a good thing. If social norms strongly tend toward trustworthiness,
cooperation, and law-abidingness, the corporate culture has less work to
do in eliciting the same behaviors inside the firm.75 There will be little or
no role conflict; employees will be happier and more productive. The late
Lynn Stout was a forceful advocate for getting rid of the detritus of
shareholder primacy so that directors can follow their natural pro-social
instincts rather than be made slaves to the production of quarterly earnings
growth and high stock prices.76 This seems to be the GSZ inference, too.
However, two concerns arise from the influence of external social
norms. One is that broader social norms may not necessarily be healthy;
we can all readily think of aspects of our prevailing culture that
corporations might want to select against rather than for in seeking
managerial talent: disrespect for authority, conspicuous consumption,
excessive individualism, and self-centeredness.77 Worse, there are some
countries and regions where the prevailing culture goes so far as to
normalize individual corruption.78 For instance, a securities firm might
72. On the role of religious beliefs in corporate governance, see generally Mufaddal Baxamusa
& Abu M. Jalal, CEO’s Religious Affiliation and Managerial Conservatism, 45 FIN. MGMT. 67 (2016);
Gilles Hilary & Kai Wai Hui, Does Religion Matter in Corporate Decision Making in America?, 93 J.
FIN. ECON. 455 (2009); Sean T. McGuire et al., The Impact of Religion on Financial Reporting
Irregularities, 87 ACCT. REV. 645 (2012).
73. See, e.g., Ahmed M. Elnahas et al., CEO Political Ideology and Mergers and Acquisitions
Decisions, 45 J. CORP. FIN. 162, 163–64 (2017); Irena Hutton et al., Political Values, Culture, and
Corporate Litigation, 61 MGMT. SCI. 2905, 2906 (2015).
74. GSZ, supra note 9, at 73.
75. Id. For example, there will be more trust of corporate disclosures in countries where the
culture is more trusting generally. See Mikhail Pevzner et al., When Firms Talk, Do Investors Listen?
The Role of Trust in Stock Market Reactions to Corporate Earnings Announcements, 117 J. FIN. ECON.
190, 190–93 (2015).
76. LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAW MAKES GOOD PEOPLE 94–118
(2011).
77. A particularly pertinent example is that one firm’s fraud increases the likelihood of fraud on
the part of other companies located in the same urban area even though they are in different lines of
business and do not compete. In other words, being proximate to yet-undetected misbehavior is a
motivator to cheat too. See Christopher A. Parsons et al., The Geography of Financial Misconduct, 73
J. FIN. 2087, 2087–88 (2018).
78. See Xiaoding Liu, Corruption Culture and Corporate Misconduct, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 307,
308–09 (2016). Amir Licht has done important work connecting national culture to many aspects of
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consciously try to de-emphasize sales pressure in customer interactions via
ethics training, only to run up against resistance from financial advisers
who interact frequently in their home locales with peers in other firms who
continue to associate inflated sales with status and success. The corporate
culture will have to push back against these unwanted pressures.
The other concern—and the potentially more insidious one—is that
these healthy social norms come to be seen as inconsistent with the
perceived “what it takes” to succeed. The firm may want hypermotivation, risk-taking, and competitive arousal in doses well beyond
what ordinary candidates display. It will select for the extraordinary
candidates along these dimensions, of course, but may also have to attract
others and acculturate them into the desired mindset. If so, corporate
culture is now doing a very different kind of work. We shall play out this
story in the next sections because it has much to say about the
manageability of corporate culture—for both good and bad. The idea that
boards and executives cannot possibly have meaningful control over all
the external cultural forces at work inside the organization injects a useful
cautionary note in discussions about the legal responsibility to manage
culture.
Neither can we assume that the corporate culture operates uniformly
or effectively throughout the corporation. Localized subcultures can
emerge at odds with what is believed or valued elsewhere in the firm, and
there will be individual defectors (perhaps many) who do not get, and may
actively resist, the preferred messages. A study of the “Nut Island” effect
tells the story of an award-winning unit of the Boston Harbor waste
disposal authority that came to resist oversight from what it regarded as
illegitimate supervision, turning that aim into such a potent belief that it
ultimately put raw sewage into the harbor rather than acknowledge the
need for help from above.79 We will come back to this in exploring how
culture is transmitted inside organizations.
It is also worth stressing the connection between peer cultures and
boundaries of the firm. In sociology and financial economics, researchers
have demonstrated the ease by which both information and ideas travel

corporate governance and behavior. See, e.g., Amir N. Licht, Culture and Law in Corporate
Governance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW (Jeffrey Gordon &
Gorge Ringe eds., 2018).
79. See Paul F. Levy, The Nut Island Effect: When Good Teams Go Wrong, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Mar.–Apr. 2001, at 51. See generally Niki A. den Nieuwenboer et al., Middle Managers and
Corruptive Routine Translation: The Social Production of Deceptive Performance, 28 ORG. SCI. 781
(2017) (discussing conscious disregard of supervisory rules by sub-unit).

2020]

Primacy, Publicness, and “Privateness”

397

from firm to firm via network linkages80 and governance overlaps (e.g.,
directors who serve on multiple boards, law firms that serve multiple
clients, etc.). Innovations in governance tools, like poison pills for fighting
off would-be acquirers81 or options backdating to make employee stock
options more lucrative to the grantees,82 for example, have been shown to
travel both of those pathways to determine who would be early adopters
and who would be late or not adopt at all.
These diverse perspectives suggest that it is overly simple to frame
questions about corporate cultures in terms of, say, the influence of the
CEO on the organization’s culture. And even if that is the focus, what
drives the CEO’s perceptions and beliefs? A CEO who runs in social or
political circles that celebrates shareholder culture, religiosity, social
service, or inflated entitlement may be moved by those values enough to
try to influence the firm to pursue them as well. Whether he or she will
succeed is far from clear. We desperately need a theory about how
corporate culture forms and changes (or resists change) and the evidence
to back it up.
III. FUNCTIONALISM
Having surveyed the meaning and role of corporate culture in various
disciplines and debates, we can now wade into deeper waters about the
work being done by corporate culture for law and governance. The
relatively more recent contributions by economists to the study of
corporate cultures posit that cultures exist and persist to the extent that
they do useful work in promoting competitive marketplace success.83 They
generate efficiencies. In developing their hypothesis about corporate
integrity, for example, GSZ spun out an interesting story. They assume
that certain ethical commitments (keeping your word, loyal customer
service) have long-term financial value but are constantly under short-term
stress.84 All other things being equal, turning these strategies into nonnegotiable cultural values inside the firm helps maintain internal
coherence and resist these stressors. But when the firm is publicly-held,
80. See generally Andrew J. Hoffman, Linking Organizational and Field-Level Analyses: The
Diffusion of Corporate Environmental Practice, 14 ORG. & ENV’T 133 (2001) (offering a cultural
account of how environmental practices spread in firms and industries).
81. See generally Gerald F. Davis & Henrich Greve, Corporate Elite Networks and Governance
Changes in the 1980s, 103 AM. J. SOC. 1 (1997) (discussing takeover defenses).
82. See generally John Bizjak et al., Options Backdating and Board Interlocks, 22 REV. FIN.
STUD. 4821 (2009) (discussing executive compensation practices).
83. Sociologists have generally been viewed as anti-functionalist, but this is not essential. For an
assessment of the state of knowledge on corporate cultures in terms of functionalism or not, see
Chatman & O’Reilly, supra note 49, at 205–06.
84. See GSZ, supra note 9, at 62–63.

398

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:377

the stress is harder to resist: the stock price fails to reflect the hard-to-value
norms, and so executive compensation and retention incentives shift
greater attention to the shorter-term.85 This is a familiar argument in the
long-term versus short-term debate in corporate law. The disclosure
demands associated with public status make it harder to enforce internal
norms when violated. This is because investors and other external
stakeholders fear that the disclosed violation may just be the “tip of the
iceberg,” indicating more problems ahead. In the absence of such
enforcement, the culture is more likely to devolve via loss of integrity.
From this they hypothesize that more CEO power vis-à-vis shareholders
(as proxied by relatively larger compensation packages) should correlate
positively with integrity, which they find to be the case.
While surely insightful, GSZ’s story begs all sorts of questions: is
the top-down inculcation of values really how it works; is integrity really
the long-term value maximizing strategy for a firm, or is it instead Oliver
Williamson’s famous “opportunism with guile”;86 is the market (or are
large investors) really unable to value corporate reputation on a forwardlooking basis? GSZ assumes that the market eventually learns of the value,
so why wouldn’t that already have occurred with enough prior experience?
Their response to all of these questions, of course, is the empirical
evidence: the positive correlation between integrity and subsequent
performance; the negative correlation between integrity and large share
ownership. Acknowledging that there is still much more to figure out, they
conclude, is at least a “first cut” that their story holds up.87
Economists’ approach to corporate culture is mostly theory-driven,
albeit with some loosening of the strict assumptions underlying
neoclassical economic theory.88 In competitive markets, culture is of
importance to the extent that it makes firms better able to survive and
thrive. Cultural content will vary from firm to firm, but inferior cultures
will gradually be weeded out in favor of more adaptive ones. So, what
would inferior or adaptive mean? As noted, the standard answer focuses
on transaction costs.89 Efficient organizational behavior requires the
coordination of a potentially immense number of agents. If there is
85. On this dynamic with respect to investments in compliance, see generally Jeffrey N. Gordon
et al., Taking Compliance Seriously (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 588, 2018).
86. See Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 453, 458 (1993).
87. GSZ, supra note 9, at 75.
88. See generally Kreps, supra note 61 (discussing coordination function); see generally, e.g.,
THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND CLIMATE (Cary Cooper et al.
eds., 2001); Eric Van den Steen, On the Origin of Shared Beliefs (and Corporate Culture), 41 RAND
J. ECON. 617 (2010); Jesper B. Sorensen, The Strength of Corporate Culture and the Reliability of
Firm Performance, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 70 (2002).
89. See Fehr, supra note 61; Langevoort, Black Box, supra note 61.
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considerable disagreement among these agents as to what is true, or
important, or legitimate, coordination will bog down in the face of
countless negotiations of reality. By hypothesis, then, a valuable corporate
culture is one that better puts everyone on the same page.
That, by itself, says nothing about the content of those beliefs. But
the same theory suggests that particular belief systems will be favored
insofar as they more effectively motivate or enable competitive activity.
Most economists assume that rational perceptual accuracy characterizes
successful economic actors. But especially from among behavioral
economists, the possibility was raised that there could be adaptive
heuristics and biases at work in corporate cultures that depart from steelyeyed realism in favor of more motivational belief systems. The most
obvious possibility is the optimistic, “can do” culture that has an excess
(though not to a dangerous extreme) belief in the ability of the firm to
prosper even against the odds.90 Such cultures might promote
perseverance, risk-taking, and long-term thinking that are rewarded on
average as against more cautious, angst-laden competitors, even if the
likelihood of occasional bad outcomes is also greater.
This idea matters to both law and governance. Some twenty years
ago, I made the speculative claim that overconfidence in managerial
behavior and corporate cultures posed a particularly interesting and
disturbing legal problem with respect to both liability standards (the
application of state of mind tests like good faith and scienter) and the
deterrence of corporate misbehavior.91 Since then, I have written about
many different manifestations of these legal problems.92 Other legal
scholars now have as well,93 with what is now an abundance of support
from social scientists. In due course, consideration has been given to other
distorted beliefs that might be individually and culturally adaptive as well.
In general, I have come to believe that competitive incentives favor
cultures that promote in-group loyalty, aggression toward out-groups, and
90. See generally Langevoort, Black Box, supra note 61 (concluding group beliefs promote
marketplace success). A large amount of literature exists on over-optimism as a stable and adaptive
bias, though most of it focuses on individual cognition and behavior. A prominent formalization of
this is Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation, 117 Q.J. ECON. 871
(2002); see also Anand M. Goel & Anjan V. Thakor, Overconfidence, CEO Selection and Corporate
Governance, 63 J. FIN. 2737, 2739 (2008). For an early and influential expression of this idea, see J.B.
Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33 (2002).
91. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. P A. L. REV. 101 (1997).
92. E.g., LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, supra note 38, at 26–28, 36–42.
93. Important work utilizing these insights includes DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM
(2006); Jayne Bernard Narcissism, Over-optimism, Fear, Anger and Depression: The Interior Lives
of Corporate Leaders, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 405 (2008); Cynthia Williams, Icarus on Steroids, 94 GEO.
L.J. 1197 (2006).
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the rationalization of moderately selfish transgressions of norms of good
behavior.94 Plenty of literature can now be cited to support these
predictions, although most of it admittedly relates to individual cognition
and behavior, not culture per se.95
This focus on the adaptive culture speaks to the possibility of cultural
change: who, if anyone, has the ability to change the prevailing culture
away from an excess of profitably self-serving bias? This is a key question
for law to ask, given recent emphasis on reforming wayward cultures by
imposing top-down responsibility for preventing failures. One
discouraging possibility is that cultures are largely resistant to change
absent a shock to the system, which is unlikely to be administered by
choice if the company is not yet in crisis. An aggressive culture perseveres
absent strong negative feedback, which can be lacking during frothy
market conditions and low enforcement intensity. Leaders are usually
better off wrapping themselves in the culture than fighting against it.
This is a dismal sounding assessment. So, what about GSZ and its
more optimistic view that the norm of integrity has adaptive value? My
intuition is that it depends on marketplace conditions—where commitment
to integrity and service really does have a long-term payoff and can be
signaled credibly, it can emerge and persist.96 But it is inevitably at risk in
the “last period” setting, when key actors come to believe, accurately or
not, that the firm’s or their own personal time horizons are tightening
94. And that competitive success itself increases these perceptions, at least at the individual level.
See Amos Schurr & Ilana Ritov, Winning a Competition Predicts Dishonest Behavior, 113 PNAS
1754, 1754–59 (2016).
95. The idea of moderation in motivated inference is consistent with the idea that people
normally do not become so ethically aggressive as to threaten their self-identity as honest and
reasonable; the danger is the slippery slope and other cognitive enablers that prompt a descent into
corruption one small step at a time when the right—or better to say, wrong—situational circumstances
take hold. See John Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational
Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1179–87 (2005). For supportive evidence from neuroscience,
see generally Neil Garrett et al., The Brain Adapts to Dishonesty, 19 NAT. NEUROSCIENCE 1727, 1727
(2016). In a recent article, I described the main task of anyone in the firm (e.g., a chief ethics and
compliance offer) who wants to counter the temptations of a self-serving culture as having to counter
the most pernicious scripts that key corporate agents use to justify themselves and the behavior of
others. See Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra note 4, at 955. Tom Tyler’s work, in particular,
emphasizes that decisions to obey the law require either a strong threat of enforcement or a buy-in to
the legitimacy of what is asked. See generally, e.g., Tom Tyler, Reducing Corporate Criminality: The
Role of Values, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257 (2014). If, as is often the case, the threat itself is muted by
inadequate enforcement resources or political willpower, then legitimacy dominates. Countering this
in the name of good compliance is not easy, especially when the antipathy is deep. Indeed, there is
enough dysfunction in lawmaking, regulation, and enforcement to sustain the myths as against
arguments otherwise. A company that comes to believe that its business model will accomplish
wonders but is being held back by archaic regulatory norms has little difficulty in fostering an
aggressive attitude toward opportunism.
96. See Thomas M. Jones et al., How Applying Instrumental Stakeholder Theory Can Provide
Sustainable Competitive Advantage, 43 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 371, 371–73 (2018).
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because of intense competition or disruption of their markets. Here, the
short game comes to be seen as the only game.97 Arguably, some firms
(and industries) are so fast-paced that they take on permanent “last period”
status in terms of the kinds of beliefs and behaviors that are validated and
rewarded.98 Given that their integrity metric was drawn from the “best
places to work” survey tool, perhaps GSZ’s authors are getting their results
about the payoffs from integrity from the less visibly stressed sector of the
economy.99 Or, perhaps a bit more disturbingly, reputations are sticky, so
both the internal and external perceptions of the commitment to integrity
can persist longer than is justifiable, creating a profitable opportunity in
the relative near-term to cash in on the built-up reputational capital.100
Enron, after all, was a best place to work—number 22 on Fortune’s
ranking in the year 2000101—until it suddenly became bankrupt and
deemed a criminal enterprise a year later.
Whatever is going on in the first step in the GSZ analysis, their
second inference—that increased shareholder presence or power leads to
an erosion in integrity—makes sense under the adaptive culture
hypothesis. It seems amply plausible that external shareholder pressure
increases internal stress, which challenges the efficacy of the internal
“grease” of shared beliefs. High information asymmetry coupled with
potentially adverse consequences from bad news, or even not-so-bad
news, that cannot be processed with precision (the tip of the iceberg
problem to which GSZ alludes) incentivizes disclosure gamesmanship.102
Here, we can again borrow from psychology. Well-known work by Lerner
and Tetlock suggests that accountability can have beneficial effects ex ante
in resolving agency cost problems. However, it backfires as applied ex

97. See generally Jennifer Arlen & William Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 961 (2012) (claiming that most frauds are driven
by last period incentives).
98. See generally HO, supra note 50 (discussing the absence of long-time horizons).
99. GSZ’s authors hypothesize that integrity is discovered slowly by the capital markets. See
generally Alex Edmans, Does the Stock Market Fully Value Intangibles? Employee Satisfaction and
Equity Prices, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 621 (2011) (using best places to work data).
100. See generally JONATHAN MACEY, THE DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION: HOW
INTEGRITY HAS BEEN DESTROYED ON WALL STREET (2013) (discussing various market failures in the
face of reputational checks).
101. See generally Enron Named a Best Company to Work For, HOUS. BUS. J. (Dec. 19, 2000),
https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/2000/12/18/daily12.html
[https://perma.cc/N4P3-Z6
RK].
102. In a recent article, I develop an approach to antifraud liability for “soft” statements heavily
based by the centrality of perceived credibility and the opportunities for gamesmanship otherwise
created. See Donald C. Langevoort, Disasters and Disclosures: Securities Fraud Liability in the
Shadow of a Corporate Catastrophe, 107 GEO. L.J. 967, 984–85 (2019).
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post, leading to defensiveness rather than integrity.103 Where that becomes
the inclination, it would be difficult to maintain a healthy culture. Again,
this is situational. Firms that are for the moment generating mainly good
news can celebrate honestly. But when the internal news turns sour and
potentially blameworthy, the temptation to turn to denial and
defensiveness strengthens. The gamesmanship (or worse) is thereby
legitimized.
All this leads me to a brief observation about “short-termism” in the
corporate governance debates.104 For reasons discussed earlier, I am
reasonably well persuaded that integrity is undervalued in the capital
markets. Not because integrity is unimportant, but because it is hard to
commit to the credibly-given dynamics just described. Some firms
overcome the challenge and gain stable and reliable reputations, but most
do not. Credibility, then, is a key variable, which when doubted by the
marketplace leads to managerial (and cultural) frustration and greater
inwardness. One foreseeable managerial response is to take steps to
manage impressions better—salient short-term actions that will have a
payoff. Cost cutting is a possibility, which can produce the pressures and
rationalizations that cause a drop in ethics and heightened compliance
risks. That much I concede, is consistent with the empirical observations.
Going public generates ethical stress. But it is mainly when managerial
credibility is already in doubt that makes it unfair and misleading to
attribute any cultural devolution to investor greed or amoral myopia, much
less legal norms about serving shareholders. In the end, managers of such
firms are as complicit as anyone for setting in motion the kind of internal
culture where self-serving visions of success and survival come to
dominate. If so, more managerialism would not be a good antidote.
IV. CULTURE AND THE PRIMACY DEBATES
The political push in favor of greater managerialism implies that
diminishing the influence of investors would bring about a return to
benevolence and a greater focus on the collective long term. Integrity and
stewardship values can be restored to cultural prominence. The detritus of
shareholder wealth obsession flows out of the system, replaced by cleaner
water. So, the managerialists’ campaign slogan promises. But our survey
of how cultures evolve gives reason for doubt.
The managerialists may be right in their prediction, of course—there
are foreseeable political and economic conditions where that could
103. See generally Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999) (discussing pressures to reveal or cover up).
104. More broadly with respect to arguments about whether short-termism is a problem in the
first place, see generally Roe, supra note 38.
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happen. But if my hypothesis is right that cultures emerge and change
organically as survival mechanisms to adapt to perceived conditions,105
this is hardly assured. Increasing stress is likely to be a constant in a global,
technology-driven economy.
Notwithstanding anecdotal evidence, like Enron’s positioning of a
stock ticker display in its headquarters lobby,106 I am skeptical that
corporate managers ever embraced a norm of shareholder primacy, so
much as paying it lip service from within the familiar protections of the
business judgment rule. My hypothesis is that corporate managers have a
deep-seated suspicion of shareholders, considering them insufficiently
knowledgeable about long-term firm value and/or biased by conflicts of
interest. In other words, managers understand the power investors have,
especially over market prices, but resent it as an unwarranted imposition.
Shareholders are therefore perceived as out-groups, not in-groups. The
just desserts from success are divided up among managers and
stakeholders pursuant to a bias on the part of directors that sees the
managers as main creators of the value107 and lesser stakeholders
(including shareholders) as mere suppliers of resources who need to be
paid. The stock and options in which managers are paid naturally make
them want high stock prices—they are by no means indifferent to that
which also produces shareholder wealth. But the myth and the resulting
motivation ascribe something more sacred to marketplace success, even if
objective outsiders might see in this something akin to what psychologists
refer to the fundamental attribution bias (i.e., taking excess credit for
success, while externalizing blame for failure).108 This frustration has led
to the campaign we identified earlier, pushing back hard to recreate the
world of managerial autonomy as against the supposed short-termism of

105. See Langevoort, Black Box, supra note 61, at 92–93 (“My account indeed suggests that
corporate cultures can produce behaviors that are largely self-serving responses to their particular
economic environment, and in the face of strong competition, make very few trade-offs in pursuit of
survival and success”). Along these same lines with specific reference to principal-agency theory, see
J.B. Heaton, The “Long Term” in Corporate Law, 72 BUS. LAW. 353, 353–56 (2017) (discussing how
the battling over corporate law “masks the real battle, one between a rational desire by clear-sighted
shareholders for shareholder value maximization, on the one hand, and a desire by the courts and
others for corporate longevity—i.e., long-term corporate survival—on the other”). Heaton points to
the role of cognitive biases in the effort to understand this battle. Id. at 366.
106. See LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, supra note 38, at 37.
107. I made the argument around the time of the scandals that it was no coincidence that most
all those firms were in markets characterized by rapid technological change and thus backwardslooking regulatory structures that could easily be rationalized away as dangerously anachronistic in a
greased-up culture, leading to a slippery slope of accelerating malfeasance. See generally Langevoort,
Technological Evolution, supra note 29.
108. See Guoli Chen et al., Making the Same Mistake All Over Again: CEO Overconfidence and
Corporate Resistance to Corrective Feedback, 36 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1513, 1514–15 (2014).
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shareholder influence. But as we noted earlier and will soon come back to,
there is another way of reading that story.109
The historical image of twentieth century managerialism as a golden
era wrecked by shareholder primacy may well be a self-serving myth.
Brian Cheffins points out in recent work that there is evidence of little
scandal and high willingness to contribute to labor peace and maintaining
the social infrastructure,110 but he observes that this was a product of a
unique time in American history, with a surplus of rents to collect and
spend, not likely to be repeated going forward. I doubt that that time was
ever as pro-social as portrayed,111 but agree with his assessment of its
historical contingency to whatever degree it was accurate. Unless coupled
with a step up in what government or the public insist on from large firms,
the golden era image works mainly as a rallying cry for taking back control
along with the rents.
And the latter brings us back to publicness. The hoped-for
consequence of the dismissal of shareholder primacy, to many, is to create
a vacuum that would be filled with pro-social norms. With enough external
pressure and the right political conditions, it could. But, I doubt that such
pressure would be any more welcome inside the corporate culture than
shareholder demands. At first glance, this should pose no comparable
threat to internal culture. Disclosure and accountability are soft and benign
sounding demands that would not be likely to generate much internal
dissonance, especially when the cultural boundaries of the firm are
relatively porous. There is ample evidence that successful engagement
with stakeholders in response to the expectations of publicness pay off for
perceptive firms.112
109. One of the fundamental assumptions in sociology and anthropology is that beliefs matter
greatly in determining social norms (and vice versa), quite apart from whether they are true. See
generally Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyers, 74 CHI. KENT L.
REV. 1569 (2000) (discussing self-serving myths). Field theory posits that powerful actors will try to
co-opt ideas to legitimate rent-seeking behavior. See Fligstein, supra note 53, at 255–56 (using field
theory to explain emergence of shareholder primacy norm).
110. This account is developed in full in BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, THE PUBLIC COMPANY
TRANSFORMED 343–98 (2019).
111. The mechanisms that lead to the public exposure of illicit corporate behavior have become
far more sophisticated and intensely driven than they were back then; indeed, some of these
mechanisms are the product, directly or indirectly, of changes in public capital markets. See generally,
e.g., Alexander I. Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213 (2010)
(discussing incentives to report fraud). And the commitment to pro-sociality was to a distinctly
conservative vision of the public good, spreading its benefits very unevenly.
112. See Witold J. Henisz et al., Spinning Gold: The Financial Returns to Stakeholder
Engagement, 35 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1727, 1727–29 (2013) (discussing positive financial valuation
effects of greater stakeholder engagement). See generally Karl V. Lins et al., Social Capital, Trust,
and Firm Performance: The Value of Corporate Social Responsibility During the Financial Crisis, 72
J. FINANCE 1785 (2017) (discussing the value in pro-social investments).
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But at many firms, I suspect, the demands of publicness are also
coded as threats, especially when the internal culture feels under attack
from outside. The demands can seem harsh and unforgiving,113 and are
thus interpreted as unfair and undeserved in order to maintain cognitive
consistency and self-respect. So, they trigger denial and reactance.
Honesty is a hard norm to maintain when outside groups demand
transparency, accountability, and voice, and those inside (via selfdeception or not) come to believe that the truth will be distorted or
misunderstood in applying those demands. In particular, elite managers
and other incumbents will see publicness as a threat to the efficiency of
the internal corporate culture as an extension of their attitudes, beliefs, and
preferences. So, my hypothesis would be that many of the concerns about
external demands undermining the coherence and efficiency of the internal
culture are present with respect to publicness as well.
Again, this depends on how forceful publicness is. I lean in favor of
it as valuable to corporate law and governance but have to concede that
there are open questions. A largely unexplored aspect of publicness has to
do with the efficacy of the demands—Do they actually pay off in a
meaningful way for stakeholders and society, if not in dividends or capital
appreciation? Publicness is hard to measure empirically. Maybe measures
of social responsibility and sustainability are workable proxies for
publicness. However, the state of the art of assessing its embrace and
sustainable commitment (and who it benefits) is still early-stage. For all
the skirmishing in the aftermath of multiple scandals in the last two
decades, transparency remains limited, accountability often fails
dramatically, and outsider voices are amplified but still may not matter.
We may have what Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have described as a
world of corporate governance that uses symbolic public palliatives to
normalize concentrated corporate control with weak effects in terms of
outcomes.114 They can be more about identity politics than real stakeholder
influence.115 If so, the internal corporate invective that the demands of
publicness badly fail a cost–benefit test cannot be dismissed as mere
defensiveness, even though I suspect it often is. Myths thrive by ingesting
grains of truth. The pushback against publicness may overwhelm it so all
that would fill the vacuum in the demise of shareholder empowerment is
autonomy in the gathering and distribution of rents.

113. See Fisch, supra note 33; Sale, supra note 33.
114. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 26, at 2036–37.
115. See generally Hill, supra note 26 (discussing the value of identity-based incentives to fight
battles, possibly beyond their economic significance).
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V. PRIVATENESS
The cultural effects of external pressures from public shareholders
and stakeholders can usefully be assessed by imagining conditions in firms
where those pressures are weakest. Firms vary in their susceptibility to the
amalgam of legal and extralegal pressures. SEC registrants get a big dose
of it for that reason alone. However, a large, closely-held corporation is
subject to regulatory demands (including the antifraud parts of the
securities laws) and many of the legitimacy demands that come from
consumers, politicians, the media, and other stakeholders. Size matters,
but the heft of the company’s footprint on society does even more. It is all
a matter of degree, a recursive loop of law and public salience.
Almost by definition, then, there will also be certain corporations that
face less pressure, inhabiting a dimly lit social and economic setting closer
to “privateness” than publicness. Corporations gain a greater degree of
privateness by avoiding public share ownership, though as just noted,
autonomy may be limited by other factors: size, field-specific regulatory
intensity, or visibility in public-facing product or labor markets. So, the
natural question relating to culture is to ask what we might predict as we
move toward greater privateness. Empirical work is less helpful here
because private firms generate less data for the variables that might affect
culture.116
Consistent with the earlier conjectures about how publicness
decreases internal culture coherence by challenging the beliefs and power
negotiations (self-serving or otherwise) that grease the internal corporate
machinery, a plausible assumption would be that privateness at the very
least enables a stronger, more coherent internal culture. Private firms face
far less pressure to speak publicly about sensitive matters, avoiding the tip
of the iceberg problem that GSZ identify.117 Messages in a relatively
closed system are less likely to become mixed or garbled and are more
likely to stay on script. Governance need not be negotiated as much.
This prediction, then, aligns with GSZ—on average, cultures in the
private ownership space have more stability under stress, producing longterm value when the underlying values are about integrity and care for
stakeholders. But I suspect that there is considerable volatility and
considerable risk associated with too much privateness. Private firms are
116. Private companies are also very diverse and under-theorized, so that drawing from some
overarching governance paradigm is foolish. See Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). Tech start-ups differ considerably in terms of likely cultural influences
from family owned companies that have been around for decades; the latter more likely reflect the
mythology of family itself, expanded to include employees as family.
117. See Levy, supra note 79. See generally Nieuwenboer, supra note 79 (discussing conscious
disregard of supervisory rules by sub-unit).
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also likely to be places where the prevailing power structure can perpetuate
a culture that reflects the beliefs, egos, and desires of those in charge,
which will not always be so benign or other-regarding. The Nut Island
effect, mentioned earlier, shows what can happen when a subculture
becomes obsessed with privilege and privacy.118 And successful startups
surely have their own narratives about risk-taking (and rule-bending) that
resist the discipline of internal controls and full disclosure.119 I would
suggest something of a U-shaped curve, with cultures doing their best
when checks and balances are working.
These conjectures require rigorous testing, of course, which again is
not particularly easy. Data is harder to come by for private firms, and when
privacy and freedom are prized, those in power may not open up candidly
to ethnographers or survey-takers. Anecdotally, the story told about
private companies that have taken on an outsized (but not publicly visible)
role in conservative politics is unsettling. An apparently large number of
the leaders in the corporate liberty (anti-regulation) movement—for which
the Koch brothers have become the most well-known—had run-ins with
environmental, consumer protection, or securities regulators earlier in
their firms’ histories.120 The anger turned into denial and rationalization.
Cultural scripts that de-legitimatize regulators by stressing the
oppositional ideology behind law making (e.g., EPA staff as radical
environmentalists) or its mindlessness—lazy bureaucrats who have never
had to sell a product or meet a payroll—substantially reduces the felt need
to obey the law for reasons short of fear of sanctions.121 In turn, such a
cultural trope enables more aggressive political spending to disable or
impoverish the regulators even more. Here, in a reversal of the common
assumption about how the general culture influences corporate culture, the
rationalizations from inside the corporate world come to affect (or infect)
the political and social culture. As our society becomes more and more
polarized, with far too many people convinced that Washington is the
118. See Benjamin van Rooij & Adam Fine, Toxic Corporate Culture: Assessing Organizational
Processes of Deviancy, 8 ADMIN. SCI. 23, 25–26 (2018); see also Levy, supra note 79, at 52.
119. See Pollman, supra note 116 (giving examples of start-up monitoring failures).
120. Stories of the radical right’s multi-billion-dollar commitment to supporting “scientific”
attacks on regulation (and the disingenuous building of political alliances with gun owners or abortion
opponents for mutual support to gain leverage in the attacks on regulation) stress how many of the
biggest donors to this cause passed through a crucible of litigation where they or their companies were
targeted by regulators. See JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES
BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT 15–20 (2016).
121. This kind of motivated cynicism is a significant challenge to organizational compliance
with law, as I have stressed in other work. See Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, supra note 4, at
961; see also SOLTES, supra note 56, at 157–58 (rationalization of white-collar crime via denigration
of law-makers and law-enforcers). See generally Todd Haugh, The Criminalization of Compliance, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215 (2017) (discussing reactance to heavy-handed enforcement and
compliance tactics).
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official year-round home of the devil and his helpers from the domain of
publicness, I strongly suspect that there will be even more corporate
cultures where the illegitimacy myth becomes infectious.122
All this brings more resonance to the legal debate, for example, of
whether to require public companies to disclose their political activities
and spending practices.123 Proponents (like me) think that such disclosure
would be valuable to shed sunlight on the possibility that senior managers
use corporate funds to foster their personal political preferences, which
they simply rationalize as corporate best interests; opponents push back
with claims that market pressures and good governance practices suffice
to assure that management keeps its eye on wealth maximization alone,
and disclosure will compromise savvy political strategies. Surely there is
a cultural angle to this that deserves to be explored as to both public and
private firms.
CONCLUSION
We have now circled back to the governance wars introduced earlier
in this Article. This has become bitterly contested territory to committed
managerialists, and so it may have seemed shocking that in August 2019,
the Business Roundtable—CEOs of the largest corporations in America—
publicly disavowed the shareholder primacy norm that it had endorsed
since 1997 in favor of a commitment to all corporate stakeholders, a nod
to publicness.124
There was no reference to corporate cultures in this. The ease of the
shift, however, bolsters one claim that I have been making throughout this
Article: that management has never thoroughly embraced shareholder
primacy as a value, instead resenting its demands. As to a commitment to
publicness, the shift says nothing about actually being accountable, truly
transparent, or giving stakeholders any real power, and so adheres to the
long-standing managerialist goal of autonomy over all else. The business

122. A similar observation might be made about religiosity—corporate power structures
supported by an internal culture that self-identifies as strongly religious (e.g., Hobby Lobby) operates
mostly in partial darkness but projects outward politically as well. On the need for ethnography in
exploring this unique sort of corporate culture, see Gordon, supra note 50, at 373–77.
123. For explorations of this issue, see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Untenable Case
for Keeping Investors in the Dark, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Michael D. Guttentag,
On Requiring Public Companies to Disclose Political Spending, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 593
(2014).
124. The statement was made public at Press Release, Business Roundtable, Business
Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All
Americans’ (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-thepurpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/349VFQ2P].
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leaders are simply making a strategic bet that the “shareholders above all”
movement, for now at least, is becoming less politically appealing.
So, I doubt that any battle lines are actually being redrawn, even
though some fractures along the fronts have become visible.
Managerialists have for some time been divided between hard-core
libertarians and those seeking accommodation in search of social license.
The former continue to seek a wider swath of autonomy and corporate
privacy almost as a natural right. The First Amendment has emerged as a
newly potent litigation tool, enabling this campaign in terms of brute
political spending125 and perhaps—depending on how the law of corporate
freedom of speech turns over the next few years—creating more space for
a constitutional freedom not to speak so as to check the regulatory state’s
love affair with disclosure requirements.126
We should not even try to predict the outcome of any of these
forthcoming battles, much less the so-called war. Both shareholder rights
and stakeholder rights are loosely perceived as progressive causes, as we
have seen, but many left-leaning participants have a strong aversion to the
power and privilege associated with massive holdings of investor wealth,
especially when directly at the production of even more shareholder
wealth.127 The right has in the recent past been a reliable ally for
managerial power, but as Steve Bainbridge writes, there is potential stress
here as well if right-leaning economic populism redraws the terms of
corporate social responsibility in its own nativist image.128 So, other
influential actors in the business community seem anxious to make peace
on both fronts, fearful of the angry direction in which public discourse is
turning.
For a few years now, evidence has mounted that the public
corporation as we knew it for most of the twentieth century is in decline,

125. On the connection between corporate political expenditures enabled by cases like Citizens
United and publicness pressures, see generally Sarah C. Haan, The CEO and the Hydraulics of
Campaign Finance Deregulation, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 269 (2015).
126. See First Amendment — Compelled Commercial Disclosures — D.C. Circuit Limits
Compelled Commercial Disclosures to Voluntary Advertising — National Ass’n of Manufacturers v.
Sec, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015), Reh’g En Banc Denied, 129 HARV. L. REV. 819 (2016)
(invalidating a portion of the SEC’s “conflict mineral” disclosure rules on First Amendment grounds).
On the libertarian potential in the compelled speech jurisprudence, see Sarah C. Haan, The Post-Truth
First Amendment (July 6, 2018) (unpublished paper) (on file with Seattle University Law Review).
127. See generally Bruner, supra note 14 (discussing the motivations of corporate activists on
the left and their allies).
128. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Purpose in a Populist Era 11–14 (UCLA School of
Law, Law-Economics Research Paper Series No. 18-09, 2018) (on file with Seattle University Law
Review).
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at least numerically if not in gross size.129 Many corporate governance and
corporate law scholars have weighed in on whether, why, and if whatever
is happening here is good or bad. A large part of the response is once again
political, generating endless deregulatory initiatives in the name of global
competitiveness, innovation, and job creation to bring the public company
back to health. Facilitating a world of private capital that deserves less, if
any, regulatory support and intervention beyond protecting property and
contract rights is a move that thrills conservatives in business and politics,
part of a many-faceted assault on the regulatory state and its enabler,
publicness.
The social science we have reviewed ostensibly bolsters the
deregulators’ case by offering evidence that strong shareholder rights (or
a strong norm of shareholder primacy) are a threat to good corporate
culture. I get the point that all other things being equal, highly focused
cultures are easier to maintain and generate more value in the absence of
heavy shareholder and stock market pressures, for the reasons given
above. But all other things are rarely equal, and cultures can devolve for
many different reasons. Then, something or someone has to disrupt that
cultural devolution, and shareholders may be best positioned to operate as
a check on culture run amok.
The supposed value of publicness, on the other hand, is not at all
about efficiency or profitability. Indeed, this is where most sociologists
and many progressive legal scholars seem to end up. Shareholder primacy
undermines the public good and should be curbed, whereas greater
transparency, accountability, and voice are good for us all. On the other
hand, fervent managerialists want neither and thus are inclined to lump
them together to challenge their legitimacy. That creates a political
dilemma for progressives. Precisely because publicness is so inchoate,
there is (currently) no powerful, organized force to lobby on its behalf. By
and large, it has to rely on allies, the most effective of which come from
the progressive side of the institutional investor community, or wait for
scandals large enough to create a brief moment of political opportunity to
seek something stronger. Conversely, the shareholder rights community
needs political help, too, and sees the publicness values as a supportive
ideology. Thus, publicness and the shareholder rights stay coupled to a
greater extent than they need be conceptually. In turn, effective political
attacks on one are felt by the other. If that continues, we will see what the
consequences are. Publicness remains an important phenomenon
descriptively, which is why it is so contested politically and why so much
129. See LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, supra note 38, at 111–12, 165–66. For doubts about this
hypothesis, see CHEFFINS, supra note 110, at 343–98; see also Brian R. Cheffins, The Rise and Fall
(?) of the Berle–Means Corporation, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 445, 482–83 (2018).
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effort goes into giving firms flexibility in financing, liquidity, and
governance without triggering public status.130 Normatively, it is hard to
measure its impact on corporate behavior.
My aim here has not been to answer the normative questions of what
good, if any, publicness does, or whether the turn to privateness is anything
more than rent-seeking. I hope to have said something interesting about
corporate culture: the many ways it is studied, the comparisons and
contrasts in theories about what it is and how it works, and the ways it is
influenced by and in turn influences more general social beliefs about
economic power and privilege. Corporate publicness and privateness are
competing to write the dominant narrative about the legitimate exercise of
economic power in society, seeking all the legitimacy their champions can
muster. Whatever direction all this battling takes, the importance of
corporate culture should not be ignored.

130. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 15, at 357–61.

